# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SOVEREIGN GENERAL INSURANCE No. C 02-02972 CRB SERVICES, INC., **ORDER** Plaintiff. LE BOEUF LAMB GREENE & MC RAE, LLP, et al. Defendants.

Defendants LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, LLP; Schiffrin, Gagnon & Dickey, Inc.; Allyson S. Taketa; Theresa M. Fitzgerald; Dan Hansell; Daniel M. Whitley; and Barry Zalma (collectively, "the non-Lloyd's Defendants") move this Court for an order compelling plaintiff Sovereign General Insurance Services, Inc. to arbitrate its claims against the non-Lloyd's Defendants in England, or, in the alternative, staying the case against the non-Lloyd's Defendants pending the outcome of an arbitration between plaintiff and Lloyd's of London underwriters who were originally defendants in this action but have since been dismissed from the case ("the Lloyd's Defendants").

## A. Background

Pursuant to a pair of written contracts known as "Binding Authority Agreements," plaintiff
Sovereign General was authorized to bind certain types of insurance on behalf of syndicates of Lloyd's of
London beginning in early 1999. In 2000, a dispute arose between Sovereign General and the Lloyd's
Defendants when the Lloyd's Defendants allegedly refused to honor and implement the Binding Authority

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Agreements on the grounds that Sovereign General had exceeded the premium limitations under the second
of the agreements. The Lloyd's Defendants transferred authority to settle policies under the Binding
Authority Agreements from Sovereign General to defendant Schifrin, Gagnon & Dickey, Inc. and retained
defendant Barry Zalma as legal counsel. The Lloyd's Defendants also transferred claims adjusting and
settlement responsibilities for claims arising out of the Binding Authority Agreements to defendant LeBoeuf,
Lamb, Green & McRae, LLP ("LeBoeuf"). LeBoeuf attorneys Taketa, Fitzgerald, Hansell, and Whitley
are also defendants in this action and join this motion to compel arbitration.1

Plaintiff originally filed its complaint in California Superior Court. The Lloyd's Defendants removed to federal court pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 205, which permits removal when "the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention [on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards]." Since the Lloyd's Defendants were parties to an international commercial arbitration agreement and the claims asserted against them arose out of that agreement, removal of the claims against the Lloyd's Defendants was proper under section 205.

When the Lloyd's Defendants removed to federal court, this Court assumed jurisdiction over the claims against the non-Lloyd's Defendants as well. However, the basis for jurisdiction over the latter claims is not 9 U.S.C. § 205. Unlike the claims against the Lloyd's Defendants, the claims against the non-Lloyd's Defendants-for interference with prospective economic advantage, section 17200 unfair business practices, and declaratory judgment-do not "relate∏ to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 205; see also id. § 203 (giving district courts jurisdiction over "an action or proceeding falling under the Convention"). Accordingly, this Court's jurisdiction over these claims is purely supplemental. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (providing for supplemental jurisdiction over claims "so related to claims in the action within [the court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy").

On August 22, 2002, at plaintiff's request, this Court issued an order dismissing the Lloyd's Defendants from the case. Accordingly, only the non-Lloyd's Defendants and defendant Aon Limited

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Although Aon Limited (formerly known as Aon Group Limited) is also a defendant, it does not join in this motion. As used herein, the term "non-Lloyd's Defendants" does not include Aon Limited. Leslie M. Schifrin, who was also a named defendant, died in May 2002.

remain.

## **B.** Motion to Compel Arbitration

The non-Lloyd's Defendants argue that plaintiff's claims against them are covered by the mandatory-arbitration provisions in the Binding Authority Agreements between plaintiff and the Lloyd's Defendants. They seek an order compelling plaintiff to submit its claims to arbitration on the grounds that (1) the non-Lloyd's Defendants, as agents of the Lloyd's Defendants, are entitled to enforce the Agreements' arbitration provisions, and (2) plaintiff's claims against the non-Lloyd's defendants are "so intertwined with those asserted against the Lloyd's Defendants that arbitration of the Non-Lloyd's claims under the Binding Authority Agreements is wholly appropriate." Def.'s Motion at 6.

This Court disagrees. First, to the extent that the non-Lloyd's Defendants acted as agents of the Lloyd's Defendants, such agency relationship was not in service of the Binding Authority Agreements (which provided that <u>plaintiff</u>, not the Lloyd's Defendants, would perform the tasks ultimately assigned to the non-Lloyd's Defendants). Accordingly, the non-Lloyd's Defendants' status as "agents" does not give them standing to enforce the Agreements' arbitration provisions.

Second, while the factual history of the claims against the non-Lloyd's Defendants happens to involve the Binding Authority Agreements between plaintiff and the Lloyd's Defendants, none of those claims actually arises out of the Agreements. In fact, the claims against the non-Lloyd's Defendants for unfair business practices or interference with prospective economic advantage could be brought even in the absence of the Agreements. As such, this Court cannot agree that the claims against the non-Lloyd's Defendants are so integrally related to or closely intertwined with the Agreements that the Agreements' arbitration clauses should apply. See Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1361 (2d Cir. 1963) ("[I]f the *substance* of [the] claims, stripped of their labels, does not fall within the scope of the [arbitration] clauses, the clauses cannot apply.").

### C. Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), it is within this Court's discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Having dismissed the claims against the Lloyd's Defendants at plaintiff's request, the Court now chooses to exercise that discretion. As discussed above, the remaining claims do not arise out of the Binding Authority Agreements

that supported removal of this case to federal court in the first place. Moreover, all of the remaining claims
are premised on California law. As such, it is this Court's view that what remains of this case would be
more properly adjudicated by a California court. <sup>2</sup>

#### Conclusion D.

The non-Lloyd's Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration is hereby DENIED and the case is REMANDED to California Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The non-Lloyd's Defendants' Motion to Stay is DISMISSED without prejudice.

# IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12,2002

CHARLES R. BREYER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>This finding applies to defendant Aon Limited as well.